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 Public Accommodations and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964: A Surprising Success? 
 
Brian K. Landsberg1 
 
In 1964, for the first time since the end of Reconstruction, 
Congress enacted a law banning race discrimination in public 
accommodations, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  It is 
difficult today to understand why this law, which forbade hotels, 
restaurants, gas stations, and places of entertainment to discriminate 
based on race, color, or national origin, gave rise to such heated 
opposition and the longest filibuster in the history of the U.S. Senate.  
On its fiftieth anniversary, it seems appropriate to look at the origins 
and scope of this law anew and ask: What was the legal and cultural 
landscape that helped determine the content of the Act?  What 
conditions warranted federal legislation governing public 
accommodations?  What were the objections to the Act?  Why were 
there such strong law enforcement concerns about compliance with 
the Act? 
Pursuing these inquiries leads to further questions regarding 
the implementation of the Act. First, did Title II achieve 
desegregation in the areas it was supposed to address?  [My answer 
is a slightly qualified yes.] Second, why did compliance come more 
readily to this law than to some other areas, such as school 
desegregation and fair housing?  Today, Title II gets little attention, 
while other non-discrimination laws, such as fair employment, fair 
housing, and voting rights legislation continue to produce litigation 
and garner public attention; yet, in 1963 and 1964, Title II was 
considered a key provision, as well as a very controversial one.  
Should we be surprised at the success thus far of Title II?  Looking 
                                                 
1 Distinguished Professor, Pacific McGeorge School of Law.  The author thanks 
participants in a Pacific McGeorge workshop and the Hamline Journal of Public 
Law and Policy Spring 2014 Symposium for their helpful comments on an earlier 
draft.  Thanks to Robert Mayville, my research assistant, for his outstanding 
assistance.  Thanks also to Ryann Sparrow for able editing of the draft. 
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to the future, a third question arises from current controversies over 
state public accommodations laws, which have become a new 
battleground largely because of their application to sexual orientation 
discrimination; What, if any, lessons from Title II are transferable to 
the state context? 
 
I. THE ORIGINS, SCOPE, AND ANTICIPATED 
PROBLEMS OF TITLE II 
 
When it was clear that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would 
soon become law, Burke Marshall, the head of the Civil Rights 
Division, deployed his lawyers to key southern cities to survey 
restaurants.  He sent me to Birmingham, Alabama, which had been 
the scene of demonstrations, police violence, and the death of four 
young girls when the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church was bombed. 
Before I began work with the Civil Rights Division in January 
1964, I had never been South of the Mason-Dixon line.  I had some 
limited knowledge of race discrimination in public accommodations, 
because I had heard that a privately owned swimming pool in my 
hometown of Sacramento had turned away an African-American girl 
who had arrived for a birthday party.  At this time, however, Alabama 
totally segregated public accommodations .2 .  Pressure from the 
Kennedy Administration had resulted in desegregation of airports, 
but, landing at the recently opened Montgomery, Alabama airport, I 
noticed that there were two men’s rooms and two ladies’ rooms, all 
in close proximity to one another.  Upon inquiry, I found out that one 
set had been built for whites and the other for African-Americans, 
                                                 
2 Racial discrimination in public accommodations was by no means limited to the 
South, but some northern states adopted laws banning such discrimination even 
before 1964.  In the West people of Chinese, Japanese and Mexican origin often 
met discrimination in using public accommodations.   See e.g. MARTHA 
MENCHACA, THE MEXICAN OUTSIDERS: A COMMUNITY HISTORY OF 
MARGINALIZATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN CALIFORNIA (1995), A History of 
Japanese Americans in California: Discriminatory Practices, HISTORY (Jan. 21, 
2015, 8:00 am PDT), 
http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/5views/5views4.htm. 
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but pressure from the Kennedy administration had led to the removal 
of the racial designations. 
For my work with the Civil Rights Division, I walked along 
the streets of downtown Birmingham, stopping in at every café, soda 
fountain, and restaurant, having a Coca Cola here, a cup of coffee 
there, and a visit to the Men’s room in the next.  I took notes on the 
layout and the menu of each establishment.  Though I never did go 
off the beaten path to places like Ollie’s Barbecue, and my extensive 
notes were never needed, I further observed segregation of public 
facilities. I noticed that in restaurants, African-Americans were 
served only at the take-out counter.African-Americans were sent to 
a balcony in movie theaters.  Most hotels rented rooms only to hen I 
traveled with African-American attorneys or secretaries, we stayed 
in housing on military bases.3 
By 1963, civil rights groups had established a right to 
desegregation of interstate transportation facilities and had pressed 
for stronger civil rights legislation.  Maryland, stung by embarrassing 
denials of service to African diplomats travelling to Washington, had 
become the first Southern state to ban discrimination in public 
accommodations, (but only along the Highway 40 corridor.)4  While 
some Southern public accommodations voluntarily opened their 
doors to African-Americans,5 Attorney General Kennedy thought 
that there “was already a terrible problem with the sit-ins and 
everything and it was going to get worse and worse and worse and 
                                                 
3 African-Americans have their own memories of the Jim Crow practices.  My 
colleague Carl Gabel recalls using a pay telephone in a bus station in Georgia to 
call a potential black witness; when he hung up, a police officer confronted him, 
“Did you know you were using a colored phone?”  Sonny Hereford, an engineer 
who grew up in Huntsville, Alabama, recalls: “When I was about 4 or 5 years old, 
my father had to explain to me why we couldn’t walk into Shoney’s Big Boy 
restaurant and order a meal. I knew there was food inside because of the large 
statue outside of the boy holding a hamburger up high.” Sonnie Wellington 
Hereford IV, My Walk Into History, NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE (Spring 2007), 
available at http://magazine.nd.edu/news/9874-my-walk-into-history/. 
4 Renee Romano, No Diplomatic Immunity: African Diplomats, the State 
Department, and Civil Rights, 1961-1964, 87 J. AM. HIST. 546, 574 (2000). 
5 See Gavin Wright, Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil Rights 
Revolution in the American South, HARV. U. PRESS, 2013, at 93. 
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had to be dealt with.”6  As a result, when President Kennedy 
proposed a new Civil Rights Act in June of 1963, the act included a 
ban on race discrimination in Public Accommodations.  Kennedy 
told the American people, “It ought to be possible for American 
consumers of any color to receive equal service in places of public 
accommodation, such as hotels and restaurants and theaters and retail 
stores, without being forced to resort to demonstrations in the street, 
and it ought to be possible for American citizens of any color to 
register to vote in a free election without interference or fear of 
reprisal.”  He said racial discrimination detracted from our standing 
abroad, that it led to demonstrations at home, and that it was 
inconsistent with the ideals of the United States. 
The President’s forceful words disguised concern about the 
Public Accommodations title of the bill.  The title faced strong 
opposition, based on arguments (variously couched) against federal 
compulsion to desegregate public accommodations.  Opponents 
argued that Title II violated the rights of owners of public 
accommodations to decide whom to serve, characterizing this as both 
an individual right of association and a property right.  Relatedly, 
they maintained that desegregation would result in monetary loss, 
because white customers would no longer patronize businesses once 
they desegregated.7 Opponents argued that the proposed law also 
deprived customers of the right to choose whom to associate with,8 
violated local custom, and i abridged the free exercise of religion.  
                                                 
6 Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, head of the Civil Rights 
Division, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 105 (June 20, 1964). 
7 “A host follows the customs of his community else he suffers, economically.”  
MINORITY COMMITTEE REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 23-340, at 5 (1964), 
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2436, 2441. 
8 “I think if I did not want to go into a hotel that had mixed patronage, that was a 
publicly owned hotel, that I certainly should have the right to go in a privately 
operated place that furnished and solicited only those that I chose to associate 
with.”  Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons 
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 1919 (1963) (statement of Edgar S. Kalb, Manager, Beverly Beach 
Club). 
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Overall, opponents characterized the proposal as federal intrusion 
into state and local concerns. 
Opposition came from several sources: Southern business 
people, politicians, and clergy; some Northern Republicans and 
business people; some legal scholars; and extremist groups.  
Southern opponents made a variety of arguments.  The Attorney 
General of Virginia argued that the Ninth Amendment to the 
Constitution guaranteed  “the right to discriminate in private business 
establishments such as those covered by the Civil Rights Law of 
1964.”9  The Attorney General of North Carolina argued that the 
Commerce Clause was not “designed to destroy the individualism of 
the citizens of a state nor to prohibit the social groupings and classes 
which are naturally created and molded by personal inclination.”10  
Some Southern opponents tended to repeat arguments from the 
Brown v. Board of Education cases against overruling Plessy v. 
Ferguson.  For example, the Fourth Circuit said that segregation 
“declares one of the ways of life in Virginia. Separation of white and 
colored ‘children’ in the public schools of Virginia has for 
generations been a part of the mores of her people.”11 The court also 
observed that desegregation would lead to diminished support for 
public schools—analogous to the argument that desegregation of 
public accommodations would adversely affect white patronage.  At 
a meeting with President Kennedy, a religious leader from Florida 
explained his view that “segregation is a principle of the Old 
Testament,” and that “racial integration that would lead to 
intermarriage is against the will of their Creator.”12  He later testified 
                                                 
9 Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant 
at 7, Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (No. 515), 1964 
WL 81385. 
10 Brief for the State of North Carolina as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent 
at 2, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (No. 543), 1964 WL 81102. 
11 Davis v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., Va., 103 F.Supp. 337, 339 
(E.D. Va. 1952), rev’d Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). 
12 Rev. Albert Gorner [sic], transcript of Meeting of the President with Religious 
Leaders (June 17, 1963), in  CIVIL RIGHTS, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE JUSTICE 
DEPARTMENT, vol. 9, 106, 115 (Michal R. Belknap ed. 1991) [hereinafter 
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before a Congressional committee “that Federal efforts to force 
integration as a new social pattern of life is morally wrong, un-
Christian, and in conflict with the word and will of God as well as 
historic Christianity.”13  Other Southerners argued that the law would 
violate individual contract rights,14 that legislation could not change 
racial attitudes,15 and that Congress should not reward the civil rights 
demonstrators.16 
Some Republicans agreed with the Southern opponents that 
requiring public accommodations to serve African Americans 
infringed the liberty of the owners17 and that, in any event, regulation 
                                                 
Belknap].  Religion later became a basis for attacking the constitutionality of the 
Act.  The owner of a public accommodation argued that Title II infringed his 
freedom of religion, “since his religious beliefs compel him to oppose any 
integration of the races whatever.  The court rejected this claim, because free 
exercise of religion “is subject to regulation when religious acts require 
accommodation to society.”  Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 256 F.Supp. 941, 
943 (D.C. S.C. 1966), rev’d on other grounds, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d 
with modifications, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). 
13 Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons 
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 2466 (1963) (statement of Dr. Albert Garner, President, Florida Baptist 
Institute and Seminary, Lakeland, Fla.). 
14 Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons 
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 2138 (1963) (statement of Douglas McKay, Jr. Attorney of Columbia, 
S.C., Regarding H.R. 7152 and Related Proposals Concerning Civil Rights 
Legislation). 
15 Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons 
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 2383 (1963) (statement of Jack Lowery, Esq., Attorney, Louisville, 
Ky.). 
16 Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons 
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 2274-75 (1963) (statement of Basil L. Whitener, Member of Congress 
from the 10th District of North Carolina). 
17 A Washington state supreme court justice had so argued in 1959, dissenting 
from a decision upholding the Washinton public accommodations law:  “the right 
to exclusiveness… is essential to freedom.”  Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 54 
Wash.2d 440, 455 (Wash. 1959) (Mallery, J., dissenting) (discussed in 
CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT, Defending the Right to Discriminate: The Libertarian 
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of such places should be treated as a state law issue over which the 
federal government had no legitimate power.  A representative of the 
National Apartment Owners Association echoed Southern arguments 
that the proposal would violate property rights and could not change 
the moral views of segregationists.18  Barry Goldwater, who became 
the Republican nominee for President later that year, argued that the 
bill would lead to a police state and threaten “loss of our God-given 
liberties.”19  There was a real chance that the Republican leader in 
the Senate, Everett Dirksen, would oppose the title and that this could 
kill the entire bill.20  An intellectual leader of conservative 
Republicans, Robert Bork, argued both that the bill would “self-
righteously” impose the morals of the majority upon a minority, 
thereby undermining freedom, and that it was impractical to impose 
a law “which runs contrary to the customs, indeed the moral beliefs, 
of a large portion of the country.”21  Similarly, New York Times 
columnist Arthur Krock argued that “the legislation proposes to 
                                                 
Challenge to the Civil Rights Movement, in SIGNPOSTS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY, 417, 424  (Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler Minter 
eds., 2013). 
18 Civil Rights: Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Right of Persons 
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 2252-3 (1963) (statement of Oscar H. Brinkman of the National 
Apartment Owners Association). 
19 Quoted in RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS 16 (2001).  The property rights rationale prevailed with 
California voters, who in November 1964 amended the California constitution to 
prohibit the state from restricting the right of homeowners to sell to whom they 
pleased.  The Supreme Court upheld a California Supreme Court ruling that the 
amendment was unconstitutional, because intended to overturn laws forbidding 
race discrimination in the sale of property.  Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 
(1967), discussed in Schmidt, supra note 16, at 437-438 n.83. 
20 Memorandum from Senator Mansfield, re meeting with Senator Dirksen (June 
13, 1963), in Belknap, supra note 11 vol. 13, at 30;  Mansfield-The President (June 
18, 1963), in Belknap, supra note 11 vol. 13, at 30 at 33-34. 
21 Robert Bork, Civil Rights – A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, 
at 23.  Bork later acknowledged that his position had been wrong, because “there 
are no general principles to decide competing claims of association and non-
association.”  ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 80 (1990). 
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invest the Federal Government with vast, new and penal limitations 
of individual freedom of choice.”22 
Racist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan not only opposed the 
bill, but intimidated business owners who wanted to desegregate.  In 
Ohio, a Klan leader told a Klan rally that “if our President, our 
Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white 
Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some 
revengence taken.”23  Another objection, advanced by legal scholar 
Alfred Avins24 and embraced by Senator Strom Thurmond, claimed 
that Title II would violate the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on 
involuntary servitude.25 
The Kennedy administration faced a legal policy issue.  The 
Supreme Court had held the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
unconstitutional, because neither the Thirteenth nor Fourteenth 
Amendment authorized Congress to ban private discrimination in 
public accommodations.26  The Administration was faced with a 
question: “Should it ask the Court to overrule the Civil Rights Cases 
or should it instead draft legislation that relied on the Commerce 
Clause to confer authority on Congress to ban discrimination in 
                                                 
22 Arthur Krock, In The Nation: Intolerance in the Pursuit of Tolerance, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, May 14, 1964. 
23 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  He made the speech a week after 
the Senate approved the House bill, with amendments.  It became law a few days 
later. Id. 
24 “Thus, we now find, a century after Negroes were freed from the involuntary 
servitude of cutting the hair of whites, a demand from their descendants that whites 
be forced by law to cut their hair.”  Alfred Avins, Freedom of Choice in Personal 
Service Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on Anti-discrimination 
Legislation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 254 (1964). 
25 George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth Amendment, The Power of Congress, and 
the Shifting Sources of Civil Rights Law, 112 COLUMBIA L.REV. 122 (2012) (citing 
110 Cong. Rec. 7917–22 (1964) (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond) (quoting 
memorandum of Alfred Avins)).  Representative Howard W. Smith, citing the 
Thirteenth Amendment, proposed to amend the bill by exempting persons from 
rendering labor or service without his consent.  The proposed amendment was 
defeated.  TODD S. PURDUM, AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME: TWO PRESIDENTS, 
TWO PARTIES, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 191 (2014). 
26 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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public accommodations?” In a controversial move, the Attorney 
General decided to rely on the Commerce Clause and not the 
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment; however, in Congress, even 
the proponents of the bill were reluctant to rest on the Commerce 
Clause.  A highly respected constitutional law professor, Gerald 
Gunther, wrote to the Department of Justice that “the proposed end 
run by way of the commerce clause seems to me ill-advised in every 
respect.”  He argued that “the aim of the proposed anti-discrimination 
legislation . . . is quite unrelated to any concern with national 
commerce. . ..”27  Similarly, Senator Pastore from Rhode Island 
objected, “I believe in this bill, because I believe in the dignity of 
man, not because it impedes our commerce.”28  Believing that the 
Commerce Clause provided solid support to the ban on 
discrimination by public accommodations and that the Supreme 
Court was unlikely to overturn the Civil Rights Cases, the Kennedy 
administration relied on commerce rather than the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as does Title II as finally enacted.29  The Supreme Court 
rejected claims that the Commerce Clause did not authorize the 
legislation and that the Thirteenth Amendment forbade it.30 
The Kennedy administration also had to decide on the scope 
of the proposed law.  Should the law be limited to large-scale and 
multi-state chain establishments or should it cover all?  As finally 
adopted, Title II covered almost all hotels and motels, restaurants, 
gas stations, and entertainment venues, with exceptions for transient 
lodgings with less than six rooms and for bona fide private clubs.  
This virtually universal coverage facilitated compliance by removing 
the fear that, if a public accommodation desegregated, its customers 
                                                 
27 Letter from Gerald Gunther, Professor of Constitutional Law, Standford Law 
School, to the Department of Justice (June 5, 1963) (quoted in GERALD GUNTHER 
& NOEL T. DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 336 (8th ed. 1970)). 
28 Hearing on S. 1732, Before the S. Commerce Comm, 88th Cong. 252 (1963) 
(statement of Sen. John O. Pastore, Senator from Rhode Island). 
29 See REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 114-117 (2006) 
(providing an account of the arguments in Congress for and against Title II). 
30 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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could flee to one that remained segregated.31  The exception for small 
transient lodgings was based upon an understanding that exclusion 
by a hotel or motel and exclusion by a small lodging place “carry 
different social meanings.  While a tired black family might bitterly 
resent Mrs. Murphy’s decision, they would understand themselves as 
victims of her personal choice—-and this is categorically different 
from the institutionalized humiliation imposed by a hotel clerk who 
rejects them. . ..”32 
Burke Marshall deployed Civil Rights Division lawyers to 
survey southern public accommodations because he, the Attorney 
General, and the President harbored fears that violence would 
accompany black efforts to use public accommodations on a footing 
of equality.  They had ample reasons for their concern.  Jim Crow 
was engrained in the culture of the Deep South; the Supreme Court 
had blessed racial segregation in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy.  
The Civil Rights Cases had invalidated the 1875 federal law banning 
race discrimination in public accommodations, holding that neither 
the Thirteenth nor Fourteenth amendment to the Constitution 
authorized the legislation.  The Court had distinguished social rights 
from civil rights and also said that African-Americans could not lay 
a claim to be “special favorite[s] of the law.”33  In Plessy, the Court 
had denied a right of “enforced commingling of the two races” and 
had said that the white race was superior to the Negro race.34  In the 
Deep South, state law required restaurants, hotels, and other public 
accommodations to segregate the races.  It had been only a few years 
since the federal courts had held these laws unconstitutional, and the 
custom that the law required remained ingrained. 
While Marshall may not have shared the commonly held 
belief that the government could not legislate morality, he must have 
harbored some doubts about the ability of the law to displace the 
                                                 
31 See GAVIN WRIGHT, SHARING THE PRIZE: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 94-95 (2013). 
32 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 142 
(2014). 
33 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
34 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551, 560 (1896). 
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deep-seated culture of Jim Crow.  Widespread noncompliance could 
lead to an enforcement nightmare.  The Civil Rights Division had 
found it necessary to sue one county after another to enjoin racial 
discrimination in voter registration.  The delays resulting from 
piecemeal and interminable litigation led to the adoption of the 
Voting Rights Act the following year.  If it was difficult to enforce 
laws against voter discrimination against, for example, the 67 
Alabama county boards of registrars, how much more difficult would 
it have been if thousands of public accommodations chose not to 
comply with Title II?  School desegregation provided another 
example; although the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education 
in 1954, most public schools in the Deep South remained segregated 
ten years later, and desegregation had often been accompanied by 
violence. 
Marshall was well aware that when African Americans had 
asserted their rights under rulings that interstate busses must be 
integrated, they and their white companions had met extreme 
violence at the hands of Ku Klux Klan types —- the burning of a 
Greyhound bus, the beatings and jailings of Freedom Riders.35  He 
had been intimately involved with desegregation of the University of 
Mississippi pursuant to federal court order and the resulting white 
riot that required the U.S. military to intervene.  He had sought peace 
in Birmingham, which was often called “Bombingham” because of 
the violent resistance there to African-American rights.36  He knew 
that businesses had refused service to participants in lunch counter 
sit-ins, that angry whites had attacked participants, and that local law 
enforcement had then arrested those same participants. 
Violent reactions to African-American use of publicly owned 
facilities even extended to the ocean shore.  Violence against Martin 
Luther King and others for using the public beach at St. Augustine 
                                                 
35 TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-
63 at ch. 11 (1989) (describing vividly the saga of the Freedom Riders). 
36 DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA: THE 
CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 72 (2002). 
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continued up and past the date of passage of the Act,37 even though 
(several years earlier) the Supreme Court had made clear that the 
government could not maintain segregated public facilities.  These 
reactions were both an impetus for the Act and warning signals of 
what might await the nation if the Act became law and African-
Americans asserted their rights under it.  The month before the Act 
became law, three civil rights workers were murdered in 
Philadelphia, Mississippi, adding to concern that violence would 
accompany efforts of African-Americans to use public 
accommodations. Governor Paul Johnson of Mississippi predicted 
that the Act would “divide the people” and result in “civil strife and 
chaotic conditions.”38 
President Johnson signed the Act on July 2, 1964, just before 
the July 4th weekend.  His speech to the nation when he signed the 
Act implicitly addressed many of the nation’s concerns.  He argued, 
as had President Kennedy, that the law represented fundamental 
morality, appealing as well to religion: “those who are equal before 
God shall now also be equal in the polling booths, in the classrooms, 
in the factories, and in hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, and other 
places that provide service to the public.”39  He emphasized that the 
law was not based on rancor, but on “principles of our freedom,” so 
“We must not approach the observance and enforcement of this law 
in a vengeful spirit.”40  Responding to critiques of the law, he argued 
that it gives no special treatment to any citizen and that it “does not 
                                                 
37 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-65 
at 33-40, 337-340 (1998).  On June 28, 1964, the leader of an Ohio Ku Klux Klan 
chapter threatened to march on St. Augustine, reflecting that the concerns about 
the rights of white men were not limited to the Deep South.  Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant at 6, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (No. 492) 1969 WL 
136813. 
38 CORTNER, supra note 18, at 29. 
39 Lyndon Baines Johnson, Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, MILLER 
CENTER: U. OF VA (July 2, 1964), 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3525. 
40 Id. 
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restrict the freedom of any American, so long as he respects the rights 
of others.”41 
The Civil Rights Act had created the Community Relations 
Service (CRS), based on Congress’ concern about potential conflict 
arising from the non-discrimination requirements.  The Service was 
to assist communities in resolving disputes, disagreements, and 
difficulties relating to discrimination.  Johnson highlighted the CRS 
in his speech, announcing his nomination of former Florida 
Governor, Leroy Collins, as its first head.42  He said Collins would 
help “communities solve problems of human relations through 
reason and commonsense.”43  He had earlier expressed concern that 
enforcement would meet with massive resistance, as well as hope 
that “we’ve got to have observance rather than enforcement.”44  He 
closed with a mini-sermon: “Let us close the springs of racial poison. 
Let us pray for wise and understanding hearts. Let us lay aside 
irrelevant differences and make our Nation whole. Let us hasten that 
day when our unmeasured strength and our unbounded spirit will be 
free to do the great works ordained for this Nation by the just and 
wise God who is the Father of us all.”45 
The immediate response to the enactment of Title II was 
widespread compliance, mixed with some serious non-compliance, 
cases challenging the constitutionality of the Act, and some violence.  
Civil rights historian Taylor Branch recounts that in the months after 
the Act passed “visible public separations broke down across the 
South in countless pioneer dramas. . .”46 
There were definite trouble spots.47  As one might have 
expected, one was Selma, Alabama.  As recounted by U.S. District 
Judge Daniel Thomas, 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 CORTNER, supra note 18, at 27. 
44 Id. 
45 Johnson, supra note 34. 
46 BRANCH, supra note 32, at 388; see also ZIETLOW, supra note 26, at 122. 
47 WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 97-98 (showing that “In many localities, the first 
reaction of proprietors was often open defiance,” but “[w]ithin two or three years, 
the overwhelming majority of establishments were committed to compliance.”). 
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About 3:00 p.m., on July 4, 1964, four Negro college students 
(two male and two female), who were in Selma in connection with 
the literacy project, attempted to obtain service at the Thirsty Boy 
Drive-In. The owner called Sheriff Clark, although his normal 
practice was to call the city police. The sheriff and several deputies 
arrived. A form affidavit was handed to the proprietor to sign; the 
warrants charging trespass after warning were already partially 
completed. The four Negro students were arrested, . . .; one of the 
students had an additional charge of resisting arrest lodged against 
him when he responded to the electrical shocks; another had placed 
against her an additional charge of carrying a concealed weapon— a 
bicycle chain and padlock. All four of these Negro students were 
required to answer a two-page questionnaire about their civil rights 
activities. All were lodged in jail. 
Later on July 4 between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m., ten to fifteen 
Negro teen-agers, after purchasing tickets and securing permission 
of the management, entered the formerly white section of Selma’s 
Wilby Theatre; this was the first time an attempt had been made to 
desegregate the theatre. At the time of this occurrence, city police, 
deputy sheriffs and ‘possemen’ patrolled the theatre area; around 
5:30 p.m., when additional Negroes attempted to enter the theatre, 
they were blocked by a group of white citizens; an altercation 
occurred, and when police were summoned by the management, the 
police, deputies, the sheriff and ‘possemen’ responded; both white 
and Negro groups on the outside of the theatre were dispersed. 
Several unknown white citizens entered the theatre to remove the 
Negroes; the manager advised the Negroes to leave— they did; at 
this time some of the sheriff’s deputies were inside the theatre. The 
officers— police, sheriff and possemen— did nothing on this 
occasion to protect the Negroes in their use or attempted use of this 
place of public accommodation; instead, they chased them from the 
theatre entrance and stood by while the whites forced them from the 
inside. The theatre was closed for the day upon the order of Sheriff 
Clark.”48 
                                                 
48 United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala. 1965). 
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At least six Selma restaurants refused to serve African-
Americans.49  The black patrons at the Thirsty Boy were not just 
arrested; the Sheriff’s deputies used electric cattle prods in arresting 
them.50  Similarly, in St. Augustine, Florida, restaurants denied 
service to African-Americans, who also were assaulted by whites, 
including members of the Ancient City Gun Club.51 
However, many public accommodations peacefully 
desegregated.  For example, African-American lawyer Solomon 
Seay tells the story of his family’s outing to the Elite Café in 
Montgomery, Alabama around 5:30 on July 2, 1964.52  The Seay 
family sat at a table, but the servers ignored the family. Mr. Seay 
asked the manager whether they would be served and was told that 
the President was expected to sign the Civil Rights Act at 6:20 pm.  
“We would be served at 6:20 P.M., and not one minute before, he 
added.”53  I was able to experience this shift myself when another 
white Civil Rights Division attorney and I took two African 
American secretaries to lunch at the Holiday Inn in Montgomery, 
Alabama.  We got approving smiles from the doorman and bellmen 
and disapproving scowls from the waitresses, but we were served 
without incident, in contrast to the treatment of the African 
Americans at the Thirsty Boy (fifty miles away) in Selma.  
Desegregation of public accommodations gained acceptance 
more readily in urban centers than in rural areas.  In early 1965, 
African Americans in the small towns of Marion and Uniontown, 
Alabama met resistance when they tried to desegregate local 
restaurants.  That summer, a group of African Americans set out to 
integrate the Gulf Café in Morton, Mississippi.  The Chief of Police 
threatened them with his pistol and beat up two of them.  The 
                                                 
49 United States v. Warren Co., 10 RRLR 1293 (SD Ala. 1965) (three judge district 
court; citations to RRLR refer to the Race Relations Law Reporter). 
50 In preparing for the trial of the case, I gave myself a mild jolt with an electric 
cattle prod.  Never again will I do that! 
51 Williams v. Connell and Bolden v. Allen, 9 RRLR 1427, and Plummer v. Brock, 
9 RRLR 1399 (M.D. Fla. 1964). 
52 I knew the Elite [pronounced ee’-light] as the hangout for Alabama politicians, 
judges, and lawyers. 
53 SOLOMON SEAY, JIM CROW AND ME 22 (2008). 
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Department of Justice charged him with the crime of willfully 
depriving individuals of civil rights under color of law,54 but he was 
ultimately acquitted. 
 
II. SUCCESS OF TITLE II 
 
The Supreme Court upheld Title II’s application to hotels and 
motels and restaurants on December 14, 1964, six months after the 
law took effect.55  A year after the law went into effect, the Attorney 
General’s annual report noted: “Voluntary compliance with Title II 
has been most gratifying.  Places of public accommodation have been 
voluntarily desegregated . . . in [such cities as Birmingham, Jackson, 
New Orleans, Jacksonville, and Savannah].”56  The report also noted 
that where there were complaints of non-compliance “in the majority 
of instances institution of an investigation by the FBI has led to 
compliance.  Only a minority of cases have required litigation.”57 
The following year, the report noted “a high incidence of 
voluntary compliance . . . in cities and urban areas, but significant 
patterns of non-compliance . . . in rural areas in several Southern 
states.”58  One important case enjoined an association of 122 
restaurant owners in the Shreveport, Louisiana market from refusing 
equal service to African-Americans based on the pretext that they 
were private clubs.59  The website for the Civil Rights Division 
shows the Division bringing only 21 public accommodations cases 
                                                 
54 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. at 203 (1966).  The incident is described in detail in 
Frank Schwelb, 
Mississippi in the Sixties and Other Experiences: The Contemporary Memoir of a 
Justice Department Civil Rights Lawyer (2012), available at 
http://judgeschwelbcivilrightsmemoir.com/Index2.htm/Welcome.html, 
55 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
56 Annual Report of the Attorney General for 1965, 182. 
57 Id. 
58 Annual Report of the Attorney General for 1966, 207. 
59 United States v. N.W. La. Rest. Club, 256 F.Supp. 151 (W.D. La. 1966). 
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in the past thirteen years, while bringing 57 fair lending cases during 
the same period.60 
Once compliance was generally established, second-
generation issues arose. Most of these issues resulted from ambiguity 
in the law regarding implementation. For example: Were amusement 
parks covered?  Were drive-ins covered if most of their wares were 
sold for consumption off premises?  What about pizza delivery 
companies?  What establishments qualified for exemption as bona 
fide private clubs?  How were plaintiffs to prove their case? When 
night clubs select who may enter, what will be proof of 
discrimination?  Must the plaintiff prove discriminatory intent, or 
does proof of disparate impact shift the burden to the defendant to 
justify the impact?  At present, the courts have answered many, but 
not all, of these questions. 
I do not want to leave the impression that there are no 
problems.  Derrick Bell has shown that racial discrimination in public 
accommodations is not dead; Title II does not cover every public 
accommodation.61  For example, Bell mentions taxi drivers who will 
not take African-American passengers —- a violation of local 
regulation of cabs, but hard to prove and enforce, and not a violation 
of Title II.  The bona fide private club exception in Title II allows an 
unknown number of establishments to discriminate based on race.62  
In addition, more subtle forms of discrimination undoubtedly exist 
and are more difficult to discover and to prove in court. 
Today, hardly any public accommodation will say to a 
prospective customer, “we don’t serve blacks.”  Bell mentions slow 
service, confining minorities to less desirable tables or motel rooms, 
discrimination in application of disco dress codes, and differential 
fees, as examples.63  Some of the Department of Justice (DOJ) cases 
                                                 
60 The Civil Rights Division, Housing & Enforcement Cases, THE UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Jan. 21, 2015, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/caselist.php#pa. 
61 DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 579 (6th ed. 2008). 
62 “[T]housands of ‘bona fide’ clubs and organizations…continue policies and 
practices that deny the personal dignity of all blacks simply because they are not 
open to all whites.” Id. 
63 Id. at 570-73. 
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fall into this category, and a few of these cases become nationally 
publicized in news stories.  For example, discriminatory service to 
black Secret Service agents by a Denny’s Restaurant in Annapolis, 
Maryland became a cause celebre, and a DOJ investigation and 
several lawsuits led to Denny’s agreeing to pay $45 million to over 
4,500 victims of discrimination.64  Latent racial attitudes have not 
been eliminated, as current voting controversies remind us.  It is 
always possible that the attitudes could resurface in public 
accommodations as well, though the recent recession did not bring 
new life to race discrimination in public accommodations. 
The most integrated institutions in the U.S. today are our 
public accommodations.  One who goes to a café in a Southern town 
today would find blacks and whites (who attend or work at largely 
segregated schools, live in segregated residential areas, and attend 
different churches) sitting at adjacent tables or even the same table, 
seemingly without even noticing.  The demonstrators who were 
treated as criminal trespassers when they engaged in sit-ins at lunch 
counters are now treated as heroes. 
Why did Title II succeed, while school desegregation and fair 
housing, not to mention voting rights (which ordinary non-
discriminatory laws had failed to protect,)  continued to meet such 
resistance,?  One answer may be the nature of public 
accommodations.  They are, as the name suggests, accommodations 
that are open to the public.  In a sense, Title II restored the common 
law principles that, “At common law, innkeepers, smiths, and others 
who ‘made profession of a public employment,’ were prohibited 
from refusing, without good reason, to serve a customer.”65 
                                                 
64 Id. at 572. 
65 Justice Kennedy, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1995) (quoting  Hurley 
v. Irish–American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
571 (1995)).  The Senate Report on the Civil Rights Act noted, “In the 17th century, 
Lord Chief Justice Hale expressed the authority that the public, through its 
Government, can exert over commercial enterprises dealing with the public: 
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to 
make it of public consequence and to affect the community at large. When, 
therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he 
in effect, grants to the public an interest in the use, and must submit to be controlled 
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Moreover, public accommodations are businesses whose owners 
hope to turn a profit.  Once all were forbidden to discriminate, they 
profited from an expanded customer base.  Initial predictions that 
business would decrease proved wrong.  Indeed, many in the 
Southern business community welcomed Title II for eliminating a 
barrier to non-Southern investment in the South.66 
Voting and school segregation lay at the heart of the racial 
caste system and were the keys to continued inequality.  Public 
accommodations lay at the periphery.67  While attendance at school 
is compulsory, use of public accommodations tends to be voluntary.  
While schools place students into close socialization and mixing of 
social classes, socialization is not implicit in use of many public 
accommodations, such as hotels and restaurants.  Moreover, public 
accommodations tend to appeal to various social classes, so upscale 
places get upscale customers and chains (such as Dennys) attract the 
masses.  Where public accommodations do lead to more chance of 
socialization, such as swimming pools and night clubs, the 
desegregation process has confronted more problems.  Especially at 
the beginning of school desegregation, whites feared having their 
children taught by black teachers; the relationship between customer 
and wait staff is much different than that between teacher and 
student.  As is strikingly dramatized in Lorraine Hansberry’s A 
Raisin in the Sun, whites feared that desegregated neighborhoods 
would decline in value and that fear often became a self-fulfilling 
                                                 
by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. 
He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains 
the use, he must submit to the control. (1 Harg.LawTracts 78, cited with approval 
by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877)). 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 88-872, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2363-. 
66 See Clay Risen, The Bill of the Century: The Epic Battle for the Civil Rights Act 
247, BLOOMSBURY PRESS (2014). 
67 A year after Title II was enacted Bayard Rustin observed, “in desegregating 
public accommodations, we affected institutions which are relatively peripheral 
both to the American socio-economic order and to the fundamental conditions of 
life of the Negro people.”  Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics, in BLACK 
PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 444, 445 (August Meier, Elliott 
Rudwick, & Francis L. Broderick eds., 2nd ed. 1971). 
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prophecy. By contrast, the fear that desegregation would devalue 
public accommodations was quickly overcome by the facts. 
Additionally, desegregation of public accommodations has 
not raised the same issues of remedy as other civil rights laws.  “It 
has not stirred up questions about racial preferences and quotas as 
did affirmative action and busing. Nor has it prompted federal 
bureaucrats to construct formulas for providing racial balance in 
schools and employment.”68  Similarly, “it’s a lot easier for 
individual blacks to identify discrimination in this sphere—-either 
they are denied service entirely or they are shunted to the back of the 
movie theater.”69 
Stripping away the rhetoric, opponents had made basically 
two arguments against the public accommodations law.  The first was 
abstract— the law interfered with property rights— but many 
accepted laws already interfered with the right to use one’s property 
as one wished, such as zoning laws, the law of nuisance, and health 
laws.  Moreover, the common law had imposed a duty on owners of 
public accommodations to serve all respectable customers.  The 
second argument, which the lower court in the Ollie’s Barbecue case 
adopted, was that desegregation would cause economic loss to the 
public accommodations, as whites refused to use desegregated 
restaurants and hotels.  This argument proved factually incorrect.  
Many owners of public accommodations welcomed the law, 
regarding desegregation as a means to economic gains by opening up 
the market.  Even Ollie’s Barbecue saw increased, not decreased, 
business once it opened its doors to African-Americans.70 
The Supreme Court unambiguously upheld Title II.  Thus, all 
three branches of government supported the right to use public 
accommodations free from racial discrimination. The Supreme Court 
and Congress have been much less supportive of school 
desegregation.  Title IV of the 1964 Act places restrictions on the 
                                                 
68 CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: RACIAL DESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 82 (revised 2009), available at 
http://www.crmvet.org/info/nps_public_accom.pdf. 
69 ACKERMAN, supra note 29, at 172. 
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Attorney General’s authority to sue to desegregate the schools, while 
Title II allows the Attorney General to sue whenever a public 
accommodation engages in a pattern or practice of racial 
discrimination.  While the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 
1974 lifted the restrictions on the Attorney General’s authority to sue 
for school desegregation, Congress made clear in that act that the 
neighborhood school was “the appropriate basis for determining 
public school assignments,”71 even though residential segregation 




What significance can we draw from experience under Title 
II?  There are at least two lessons one may draw from this experience.  
Surely one important lesson is that legislation can have a major 
impact on morality.  The moral code of the Deep South and many 
other areas of the United States held that blacks and whites should 
not eat in the same restaurants, sleep in the same hotels, swim in the 
same pools, or play in the same amusement parks.  While there is a 
fringe that continues to hold these beliefs, the vast majority of 
Americans now think it is immoral to exclude individuals from 
public accommodations based on race.  Gavin Wright points out that 
desegregation was accompanied by marked economic progress in the 
South, and he suggests that this progress helps explain “the dramatic 
decline in Southern white support for strict segregation between 1961 
and 1968. . ..”72  Randall Kennedy has observed that “the ethos of the 
law has helped to change hearts and minds and conduct in a fashion 
beyond what many sit-in protesters would ever have initially 
imagined.”73  Although the main impetus for Title II stemmed from 
discrimination against African-Americans, Title II successfully 
outlawed discrimination based on national origin and religion as 
well, overcoming exclusion of Hispanics, Asians, Jews, Moslems. 
                                                 
71 20 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2) (1974). 
72 WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 103. 
73 Randall L. Kennedy, Struggle for Racial Equality in Public Accommodations, 
LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 161 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000). 
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It is worth further study to inquire why this law was so 
successful in, first, changing behavior, and, second, changing the 
prevailing moral code.  Sam Bagenstos argues that Title II also 
represents rejection of the Nineteenth Century distinction between 
civil rights and social rights, which had marked what Robert Post and 
Reva Siegel call “a sphere of associational freedom in which law 
would allow practices of race discrimination to flourish.”74  Futher, 
Richard Epstein is troubled that Title II has served as a model for 
more sweeping legislation, especially at the state and local level, that 
both covers many businesses that are not covered by Title II and 
protects more groups from discrimination.  He suggests that “the 
resurgence of Title II-type obligations under modern ‘human rights 
laws’ indicates a serious and regrettable reversal of fortune. . ..”75  
The battle over the legitimacy of coercing action based on one’s view 
of morality continues, but there is no dissent from the proposition 
that the Act did change the way Americans think about race 
segregation of public accommodations.76 
Today, the public accommodations issue is arising in a new 
context.  Some business owners object to laws that require them to 
provide their services to same-sex couples.  They say that these laws 
impinge on their free exercise of religion or their right of non-
association, replicating arguments that had been made against Title 
II.  This argument was long ago rejected as a ground to invalidate 
                                                 
74 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Law, 6 STAN.L.REV. 66 (forthcoming 2014) (quoting Robert C. 
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protedtion by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislations After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 490 (2000)). 
75 Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964: 
Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 6 
STAN.L.REV.(forthcoming 2014). 
76 The morality enforced by Title II is partly grounded in the history of the racial 
caste system in the United States and partly grounded in the libertarian principle, 
articulated by John Stuart Mill.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).  
Although Rand Paul has argued that the public accommodations law violates 
libertarian principles, Mill’s ideas allow government to regulate conduct that harms 
others. 
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Title II.77  The case that has drawn particular attention is Elane 
Photography v. Willock,78 where a wedding photographer was held 
liable under New Mexico’s antidiscrimination law for refusing to 
photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony.  In rejecting claims 
that the application of the law to Elane violated the photographer’s 
rights of free speech and association and of free exercise of religion, 
the New Mexico Supreme Court relied in part on Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States,79 which had rejected the argument that 
Title II imposes involuntary servitude on owners of public 
accommodation (in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.)  The 
court relied on a distinction between commercial and private activity.  
Justice Bosson, concurring, observed, “In the smaller, more focused 
world of the marketplace, of commerce, of public accommodation, 
the [proprietors] have to channel their conduct, not their beliefs, so 
as to leave space for other Americans who believe something 
different.”80  The court held that Title II does not cover wedding 
photographers and does not protect against discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. At the same time, however, the court did not 
answer the question of whether Title II stands as a precedent for 
upholding from broader statutes such as New Mexico’s or whether 
the limited scope of Title II’s coverage distinguishes it from these 
newer state laws.81 
The implementation of Title II has also proven that law can 
be a force for economic improvement by enlarging markets.  
                                                 
77 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 256 F.Supp. 941, 943 (D.C. S.C. 1966), 
rev’d on other grounds, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d with modifications, 390 
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78 Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013). 
79 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
80 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 80 (Bosson J. concurring). 
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Segregation excluded over 25% of the potential market from public 
accommodations, and Title II expanded the potential market by 
adding African-Americans into the customer base.  While this would 
seem to be an obvious application of classic economic theory, 
opponents of the Act had prophesied that desegregation would be 
economically destructive.  The economist, Gavin Wright, finds that 
experience under Title II presents “a remarkable example of 
collective co-evolutionary learning towards a better economic 
outcome.”82  In line with the theory of the Justice Department 
(embraced by the Supreme Court,) Title II removed “‘an artificial 
restriction on the market’ [that] interfered with the flow of 
merchandise.”83 
Experience under the Act validates the controversial decision 
of the Kennedy Administration to rely on the Commerce Clause as 
the constitutional basis for Title II.  This decision then became the 
basis for a federal law that not only bans discrimination in public 
accommodations against the disabled, but also requires that the 
public accommodations make reasonable accommodations to the 
needs of disabled customers.84  The Supreme Court has narrowed the 
scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers in recent years by 
excluding from Congress’ power non-economic activity with a 
remote nexus to commerce and inactivity, even if it has a 
demonstrated nexus with commerce.85  Experience under Title II, 
however, demonstrates that the Commerce Clause ground for social 
legislation retains vitality when applied to economic activity. 
At present, as Gavin Wright notes, discrimination against 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender (GLBT) persons in the 
southern states deters high-technology business.86  Title II, unlike 
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other key portions of the 1964 Act, has never been amended.  Should 
Title II be expanded to protect GLBT persons from discrimination in 
public accommodations?  To answer that question would require 
further inquiry into the extent of discrimination by hotels, 
restaurants, gas stations and places of entertainment.  Most likely the 
discrimination occurs more in employment opportunities and in non-
recognition of marriages and in activities, such as photography, not 
covered by Title II. 
Related to the first two lessons – impact of the law on 
morality and impact on economy - Derrick Bell links interest-
convergence theory with the experience under Title II.  Bell’s 
discussion of Title II focuses on its shortcomings, while 
acknowledging that “the public generally assumes that [exclusion of 
blacks from public accommodations] is no longer acceptable.”87  Bell 
argues that throughout American history, significant advances for 
blacks came “from policies that were intended to, and had the effect 
of, serving the interests and convenience of whites rather than 
remedying racial injustices against blacks.”88  Experience under Title 
II shows that whites do benefit from non-discrimination in public 
accommodations, so the convergence of white economic interests 
and black interests in equal treatment helps explain the general 
success of Title II.  This also suggests another question, though.  Is it 
not probable that complete eradication of race discrimination from 
American life would benefit both whites and people of color?  Is it 
possible to convince whites that they would be better off without 
racial disparities in education, employment, and business? 
One can expect the lessons of Title II to guide courts and 
policy makers alike as new conflicts arise between the demands of 
equality and other values and as Commerce Clause legislation is 
considered. 
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